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Abstract—Web services via wireless technologies, mobile
services (M-services), HTTP, and XML have become important
for conducting business. W3C XML Protocol Working Group
has been developing standard techniques such as Web Services
Description Language (WSDL), simple object access protocol
(SOAP), universal description discovery and integration (UDDI).
However, at this stage, there is no standard technique for access
control in M-services.
This paper describes a secure and flexible access control scheme
and protocol for M-services based on role based access control
(RBAC). The access control architecture involves a Trusted Cre-
dential Center (TCC), a Trusted Authentication and Registration
Center (TARC) and a secure ticket based mechanism for service
access. Users and service providers register with the TARC
and are authenticated. Based on this, tickets are issued by the
TCC to users. Tickets carry authorization information needed
for the requested services. In particular, we are able to specify
access control polices based on roles. The protocols between the
various entities in the model are protected using appropriate
security mechanisms such as signatures which are used to verify
correctness of the requested service, as well as to direct billing
information to the appropriate user. Our architecture supports ef-
ficient authentication of users and service providers over different
domains and provides a secure access model for services to users.
Our model is also able to support anonymity of users. Only the
TARC is able to identify misbehaving users. We believe that the
proposed architecture forms a good basis for achieving a secure
and flexible M-service system.
Index Terms—Access control architecture, anonymity, RBAC,
secure M-services, ticket based access control.
I. INTRODUCTION
AWIRELESS Web mobile service (M-service) is a Web-based application that accepts requests from different sys-
tems on the Internet and can involve a range of wireless and
Web technologies such as GSM [1], XML [2], SOAP [3], and
WSDL [4]. Vendors and customers can provide and obtain ser-
vices without being limited by the location of an M-service.
As a result, security and privacy issues in M-service systems
Manuscript received January 15, 2003; revised August 15, 2003. This paper
was recommended by Guest Editors Z. Maamar and B. Benatallah.
H. Wang is with the Department of Mathematics and Computing, Uni-
versity of Southern Queensland, Toowoomba, Qld. 4350, Australia (e-mail:
wang@usq.edu.au).
Y. Zhang is with the School of Computer Science and Mathematics, Vic-
toria University of Technology, Melbourne City, MC 8001, Australia (e-mail:
yzhang@csm.vu.edu.au).
J. Cao is with the Department of Computer Science and Computer En-
gineering, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Vic. 3086, Australia (e-mail:
jinli@cs.latrobe.edu.au).
V. Varadharajan is with the Department of Computing, Macquarie University,
NSW 2109, Sydney, Australia (e-mail: vijay@ics.mq.edu.au).
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TSMCA.2003.819917
have become more critical, especially for mobile consumers
(e.g. moving from one place to another, or using wireless mo-
bile systems). A static access control is incompatible for such
dynamic mobile environments. Consumers may access services
across multiple service domains and it is necessary to develop
efficient cross-domain authentication and access control that
can involve roaming between domains. Cross-domain authen-
tication itself can become complicated authentication activities
when the roaming path is long and dynamic. This could limit
the future of M-service applications.
Furthermore, there can be different types of M-services. In
some cases, there can be specific binding relationships between
the participants whereas in others such as shopping, any user
may be able to access a service using say some form of elec-
tronic payment. Hence, there is a need to develop a secure access
control scheme that is flexible enough to capture these specific
bindings and take them into account while making decisions.
Also, a user may wish to access multiple M-services over a pe-
riod of time. This requires that the security management is both
efficient and effective when users change from one service to
another. There have been several proposals relating to M-ser-
vice systems [1], [5]–[7]. Probably it is accurate to say that
most of them lack the required flexibility in security manage-
ment. For instance, the Excellent e-service [5] provides service
via different channels and manages customer communication
via e-mail, text chat, and fax in the same system. However, cus-
tomers have to trust the system (e.g. with their credit card num-
bers) and there are no mechanisms for privilege management.
Another M-service system Red hat is designed to provide enter-
prise-class Linux for enterprise-class servers and applications
[6]. It supplies the source code of some productions and also
requires the private information of customers for payment. The
global system for mobile communication [1] provides mecha-
nisms for user authentication as well as integrity and confiden-
tiality, including protection of information exchanged between
mobile terminals and fixed networks. It provides only limited
privacy protection for users by hiding their real identities from
eavesdroppers on the radio interface [7].
There are several security issues that need to be addressed in
the design and management of M-services. In particular, we be-
lieve the following are critical to developing a secure and flex-
ible access control architecture.
Trust and Security Model. It is essential that there is an ex-
plicit representation of trust model in a M-service system. This
is a need to specify the trust relationships between the users and
the service providers in the system. The trust model should be
supported by security services and mechanisms that can help the
participants to make appropriate decisions. For instance, based
1083-4427/03$17.00 © 2003 IEEE
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on the trust model and the security services such as authenti-
cation and ticket based credentials, the service provider should
be able to conclude that the claimed user is who s/he claims to
be and that s/he has the privileges to access the requested ser-
vice. Similarly, based on the trust model and security architec-
ture, the users in the M-service can reliably identify that a ser-
vice provider has correctly charged for the service that has been
provided. At present, majority of M-service systems depend en-
tirely on an implicit trust model whereby the users and providers
trust each other completely. Such a scheme is not suitable for
large scale systems with numerous service providers and users
over multi-domains.
Flexibility. A basic characteristic of an M-service is that a
service can be provided to a user anywhere and at anytime. This
in turn requires an efficient cross-domain authentication and
a flexible and effective access control privilege management.
Mechanisms present in current M-service systems are not ade-
quate to fulfill these requirements. Current solutions often rely
on roaming agreements for cross-domain authentication. A user,
when applying services in a foreign domain, authenticates him-
self to the foreign service provider. This process often assumes
that the foreign service provider trusts the home domain agent
of the user and is based on roaming agreements between various
service providers. With the rapidly growing number of service
providers, such schemes will no longer be practical. There will
be a need to minimize the number of interactions between the
home and foreign domains.
Furthermore, the issue of privilege management across mul-
tiple domains poses a number of additional challenges. First,
there is a need to represent different types of privileges for dif-
ferent services in different domains. Our access control archi-
tecture is able to support a range of access policies including
role based access control (RBAC). RBAC has gained much pop-
ularity in access control, though the idea of partitioning privi-
leges in terms of specific job functions and roles have been well
known for several decades. Second, there is a need to verify the
correctness and the validity of the privileges at the time of ac-
cess to a service. This can be done by the service provider itself
or some entity that is trusted by the service provider. The se-
curity management model should be flexible enough to specify
a range of privileges and to evaluate them to make appropriate
decisions in an efficient manner.
Efficiency. Users are susceptible to being disconnected and
loosing data while accessing services in wireless environments.
Also a user may need to connect to multiple services and change
M-service systems to access different kinds of services on the
Internet. The new scheme should provide a scalable solution
for different kinds of M-services and use bandwidth efficiently,
especially in wireless networks.
In this paper, we propose a security architecture for M-ser-
vices addressing some of the aspects mentioned above. Our
architecture involves a Trusted Credential Center (TCC),
a Trusted Authentication and Registration Center (TARC)
(via UDDI) and a secure ticket based mechanism for service
access. Users and service providers register with the TARC
and are authenticated. Services are described in the TCC and
service provider by WSDL. Based on authentication, tickets
are issued by the TCC to the users. Tickets carry authorization
Fig. 1. M-service model.
information needed for the requested services. In particular,
we are able to specify access control polices based on roles.
Tickets are transferred using SOAP. The protocols between the
various entities in the model are protected using appropriate
security mechanisms which are used to verify correctness of
the requested service, the validity of the privileges, provision
of service as well as secure charging users for service usage.
Our architecture supports efficient authentication of users and
service providers over different domains and provides a secure
access model for services to users.
The billing information is stored in the TCC for the users to
view and access after service provision. There are lots of issues
associated with this [8]–[10]. This paper will focus on the access
control for M-services.
The main stages involved in the architecture are illustrated in
Fig. 1.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, basic defi-
nitions and ticket types are introduced. The basic definitions in-
clude RSA, multisignature, and RBAC. There are four different
kinds of tickets, they are tickets , , , and . A single sig-
nature scheme for tickets , is presented in Section III and
the extension of the single signature scheme to a multisigna-
ture scheme for ticket is discussed in Section IV. The security
of the proposed solution with role based access control and the
logical proof of the solution as well as its deployment in wire-
less environments are analyzed in Section V. The usage of the
scheme and related works are discussed in Section VI. Finally,
conclusions are presented in Section VII.
II. SECURITY PRIMITIVES IN THE PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE
A. Basic Definitions
To facilitate discussion, the following is a brief review of
some well-known primitive cryptographic terminologies that
will be used in this paper.
Hash function, is a hash function. For a given it is
computationally hard to find an such that , where
might be a vector.
Hash functions have been used in computer science for a long
time. They are used in several cryptographic components in-
cluding pseudo-random generators [11], digital signatures and
message authentication [12].
RSA is a public key cryptosystem that offers both encryp-
tion and digital signatures (authentication) [13]. RSA works as
follows: taking two large primes and , and computing their
product ; is called the modulus. Choosing a number ,
less than and relatively prime to . Finding an-
other number such that is divisible by .
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Fig. 2. RBAC relationship.
The public key is the pair ( , ), the private key is . The factors
and may be kept with the private key or destroyed.
It is currently difficult to obtain the private key from the
public key ( , ) for a large (say some 2048 bit integer). RSA
is often used in many different applications such as email, elec-
tronic funds transfers and remote access.
Multisignatures imply that several signatures are signed on
the same document. There are at least two ways to implement
multisignature. One method involves each person signing sep-
arately and the document being passed on from one person to
another. Another scheme involves a message being signed si-
multaneously [14].
Role Based Access Control (RBAC), in general an RBAC
system involves users being associated with roles and the roles
being associated with permissions. A permission typically spec-
ifies target objects and the operations that can be performed on
them. There are many relationships between users and roles, and
between roles and permissions as shown in Fig. 2. In terms of
administration, there is the management of user to role map-
ping (e.g. assigning users to specific roles) and the management
of role to permission mapping (the privileges associated with
the roles) [15]. In general the authorities that manage these two
mappings can be different; furthermore the strategies for man-
aging these mappings such as when should elements in these
mappings change also varies.
In 1993, the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) developed prototype implementations, sponsored
external research [16], and published formal RBAC models
[17]. Since then, many RBAC practical applications have been
implemented [18], [19] because RBAC has many advantages
such as improving the security of systems and reducing admin-
istration cost etc. However, there has been little research done
on the usage of RBAC in M-service management [20].
Typically, an RBAC model has two components, and
. Model component , called the RBAC authorization
database model, defines the RBAC security properties for au-
thorization of static roles. Static properties of a RBAC autho-
rization database include role hierarchy, inheritance, cardinality,
and static separation of duty. , called the RBAC activa-
tion model, defines the RBAC security properties for dynamic
activation of roles. Dynamic properties include role activation,
permission execution, dynamic separation of duties, and object
access. In particular, the RBAC model supports the specifica-
tion of the following:
a) user/role associations; the constraints specifying user au-
thorizations to perform roles;
b) role hierarchies; the constraints specifying which role may
inherit all of the permissions of another role;
c) duty separation constraints; these are role/role associa-
tions indicating conflict of interest:
1. Static separated duty (SSD); a constraint specifying
that a user cannot be authorized for two different roles,
2. Dynamic separated duty (DSD); a constraint spec-
ifying that a user can be authorized for two different
roles but cannot act simultaneously in both,
d) Cardinality; the maximum number of users allowed, i.e.
how many users can be authorized for any particular role
(role cardinality), e.g., only one manager.
B. Ticket Types
There are four participants (the user, the service provider,
the TARC, and the TCC) and several protocols for ticket ac-
quisition, ticket usage, clearance, and billing in the M-service
model. The user obtains tickets by running the ticket acquisi-
tion protocol. These tickets are used to access services. The user
presents an appropriate ticket to the service provider who can
verify the validity of the ticket. If the verification of the ticket
is successful, then the service provider provides the service to
the user according to the conditions on the ticket. Based on
the received tickets, the TCC prepares a charging bill for each
user. The exact forms of the clearance (payment to the service
provider) and billing (payment to the TCC) protocols are not
specified in our model. Readers may refer to [8] for details.
There are several advantages in using tickets for accessing
services [21]:
Trust: Tickets may include all required information about
services and service providers etc. Users can buy and use
the tickets to obtain appropriate services provided by ser-
vice providers. There is no contractual relationships be-
tween users and service providers.
User Privacy: Tickets can be designed to operate as pure
capabilities. The service provider can make its decision
whether to grant a service or not without identifying the
real identities of the users.
Scalability: If tickets are designed in such a way that the in-
formation in the tickets can be verified without performing
cross domain authentication in real time, then this scheme
can be scalable to large systems.
Granularity of Access Control: In principle, a ticket can
be used to capture a range of access control policies such
as role based access and privilege based access. So one can
support a fine level of access control in terms of privileges
and operations and a coarse level in terms of roles.
Delegation: In general, it is possible to use the ticket mech-
anism to transfer privileges to other entities. If the posses-
sion of a ticket gives access then delegation can be achieved
by controlling the propagation of tickets.
However a number of security issues arise such as how
to prevent illegal duplication and forgery of tickets [22].
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TABLE I
TICKET TYPES
Duplication. There are two types of duplication that need
to be considered. The first type is that users either uses or
transfers a ticket many times (similar to double spending
in electronic cash systems). The second type is an eaves-
dropper, who listens to someone else acquiring a ticket and
makes a copy for himself.
Forgery. Forgery refers to the illegal construction of a
valid ticket, which can be used for accessing resources.
Modification. Users must not modify tickets. This is
to prevent users from accessing resources for which the
tickets have no permission, e.g. a ticket that allows travel
by bus, should not be modifiable to allow travel by plane.
A ticket may bind a given user and a given service provider
together. For example, a movie ticket, which usually does not
specify who can use it (i.e., the user) or a travel card, which
may not restrict the means of transport (i.e., the service). Based
on this observation, there are four types of tickets. These are
illustrated in Table I, where “ ” means that the corresponding
entity, user or service provider is bound by the ticket, while “ ”
means that it is not.
A ticket of type , for instance, does not restrict the service
for which it can be used, the service provider who can accept,
or the user who can use it. This is very much like cash in real
life. The other extreme is a ticket of type , which can only be
used by a given user with a given service provider. An example
of this type is a flight ticket.
As shown in Table I, tickets and have only one entity
bounded and ticket has two entities bounded. We will design
different mechanisms related to each of the tickets. In some cases
usersmaywishtoremainanonymousduringpurchaseandnotpri-
vate information of the user should be shown to service providers.
Use of a ticket-based system can avoid roaming multiple service
domains. A single signature can be used in tickets with only
one bound entity (users or service providers). As a signer, the
bound entity uses a signature to authenticate a ticket. To cope
with the cases of two bound entities, it is extended to
signers (multisignature). This means that a user can get a service
if all entities agree. The signers case can also associate with
other services provided by many cooperative providers since
the number is not limited to 2. A credential_role in the TCC is
set up to issue tickets and control the user’s charging bill, and a
trusted_role in the TARC is also set up to judge conflicts. Each
user’s statement of account can be seen clearly in the TCC.
In the remaining sections, we will present schemes for the dif-
ferent types of tickets and discuss how the TCC issues a continu-
ously updated account statement for users. We will also consider
both single and multisignature schemes. We will not discuss the
ticket further since it does not bind any entities.
III. SINGLE SIGNATURE SCHEME FOR TICKETS AND
In this section, we consider a single signature scheme for
tickets and . There are four roles in the single signature
Fig. 3. Single signature scheme for tickets t and t .
scheme, signer, verifier, credential_role and trusted_role.
Depending on tickets, the signer can be a user or service
provider that signs a ticket. The verifier might be a user or
service provider that verifies the signature of the signer. The
credential_role in the TCC will issue tickets as well as provides
information for the verifier to check the signature. Whether
the signature is valid or not depends on the information. The
trusted_role is a judge to solve the conflict between users and
service providers. This is because only the trusted_role has
the secret key of the system and can trace users and service
providers. Each signer has a different but fixed identity , which
is validated once the signer is registered in the TARC and does
not include any private message of the signer. Ticket , for
instance, is bound to a user only. A user can follow this scheme
to sign a signature as a ticket, the service provider verifies it
and then sends some information to the credential_role and
asks for payment. Ticket is similar to ticket , the signers
are service providers but not users.
The outline of the scheme is shown in Fig. 3. In the system
initialization, with SOAP methods, the trusted_role sends the
private messages ( , ) to the signer when the signer is set up,
where , are computed by the trusted_role, will be used in
the first verification by the credential_role and will be used
as the first signature key by the signer. In the second step, the
credential_role verifies if the data ( , , ) sent by the signer
are valid or not, where is used in the ticket verification. The
data ( , ) will be put on a public directory in the TCC if the
data are valid. At this time, the signer can complete a message
signing job.
While the signer signs a message , the signer will send the
signed message ( , , ) as a ticket to the verifier, and the latter
checks if it is true or not, where and are computed by the
signer and may include some service information and condi-
tions, etc. The verifier cannot verify the message when the data
( , ) in the TCC are not correct. Then the credential_role can
control the usage of the ticket, and even find who the signer is if
it contacts the trusted_role. In the final step, the verifier sends a
message which includes the ticket to the TCC while the ticket is
true. The latter will update the data ( , ) that is used to issue a
charging bill. The data ( , ) is changed while the ticket is used
and the ticket is invalid if the verifier cannot get the correct data
( , ). Thus, the ticket cannot be used twice and the user can
see a clear statement.
WANG et al.: ACHIEVING SECURE AND FLEXIBLE M-SERVICES THROUGH TICKETS 701
A. System Initialization
There are two elements in a signature scheme: one is the
signer represented by consumers (users) or service providers;
the other is the verifier. As a ticket, a signature is valid only if
its verification is correct.
The trusted_role computes a public composite modulus
where factors are strong primes. The Trusted_role chooses
also prime exponents and such that:
where . The pair ( , ) is made public, and
is kept secret by the TARC as the system key. The trusted_role
computes when the signer with identity signs up:
where ( means that the element is selected
randomly from the set with uniform distribution). Then
Let . The trusted_role secretly sends ( , ) to
the signer whose public identity is . will be used as the first
signature key to issue a ticket. Obviously, it is hard to compute
from without system key under the RSA assumption.
The signer with the public key sends ( , , ) to the cre-
dential_role, and the latter verifies the following equation:
The data ( , , ) are valid when the equation is successful, in
which and are computed by the trusted_role; otherwise the
( , , ) are invalid. The credential_role publishes in a public
directory the pair ( , ) for the signer with the public key .
The initialization processes of the system are shown in Fig. 4.
B. Single Signature Scheme
The verifier can access the public values , and the public
pair ( , ) registered in the TCC. The data in the TCC must
be correct; otherwise the signed message (the ticket) cannot be
verified by the verifier.
To express the general process of the single signature scheme,
it is assumed that the messages
have already been signed by the signer . The messages
can indicate different service
requirements that are included in tickets. A user can get a valid
ticket if the signature is correct. The corresponding public key
of the signer is now registered in the public
directory of the TCC. The message for the next service will
be signed by the signer using the secret key . The
signer and the verifier perform the following steps.
Input: ( , , , ),
Signer:
1) Picks and computes:
.
2) Computes: , will be used
as the secret key by the signer in the next signing
operation.
Fig. 4. Initialization for group_1.
3) Computes the Hashing value
.
4) Computes the final witness
.
Note: A ticket is the signature ( , , ). The
ticket will be recorded at the TCC; the user will send the
ticket to a service provider when s/he needs the service.
Credential role:
The credential_role computes for the ticket, where
is published in the TCC. It will be used to verify the
ticket by the verifier and used to issue another ticket.
Verifier:
5) The verifier gets ( , , ) and knows ( ,
), then checks that:
It is easy to see that if the signer follows the protocol, the
equation will be valid.
Using this protocol the verifier is convinced with over-
whelming probability that the signer knows the secret key
. This is used but not revealed at the end of the
protocol.
6) The verifier sends the ticket to the Credential_role.
The latter updates ( , ) in the public director and takes
a record. The ticket ( , , ) cannot be used twice
since it has been marked by the credential_role.
Remark: The verifier must use the public data in the
TCC when it checks whether the signed message is true or not.
The signed message will be unavailable if the data are
changed, then the credential_role can revoke the anonymity of
the signer.
However, this scheme only suits the tickets and . The
problem of ticket cannot be solved with this scheme. A mul-
tisignature scheme to solve the problem is explained in the next
section.
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Fig. 5. Multisignature scheme for ticket t , using SOAP to transfer data.
IV. MULTISIGNATURE SCHEME FOR TICKET
We will extend the scheme to a multisignature scheme for
tickets of type . Now the number of signers is not limited to
two, instead we have signers. This means that the scheme can
also be used when services are provided by many cooperative
providers.
Now, instead of the public key of a signer (in the last sec-
tion), we use as a public keys for signers
since there are more than one signers in a multisignature.
At the beginning of the multisignature scheme, the trusted_role
computes and secretly sends the messages ( , ) to signers
in the group when the signers are set up. This step is same as
the first step in the last section. In the second step, the creden-
tial_role verifies if the data ( , , ) sent by the signers are
valid or not. A vector , as the group
public key, will be put in the TCC, where is computed by the
credential_role and will be used in the first ticket verification,
then the group can sign.
In the signature process, the credential_role gets pairs of
data ( , ) from the signers with identity
when a message is signed, where ( , ) are computed by
the signer . In the next step, the credential_role sends the
signed message
to the signer as a ticket, where is a public integer defined in the
system initialization. The ticket will be sent to the verifier and
the verifier checks if it is true or not. The verifier may not verify
if the data in the TCC is not correct, and the signed message
is invalid. Therefore the TCC can revoke the anonymity of the
signers. In the final step, the verifier sends the ticket to the TCC
and then the credential_role can make a record for the ticket.
This process is shown in Fig. 5.
Suppose there are signers in the signature
system to sign a message simultaneously, for ticket , two
signers are enough. Therefore the scheme can also cope with
some other cases for example some services provided by many
providers.
A. Scheme Initialization
Similar to the previous section, the pair ( , ) is made public,
and is kept secret by the TARC as the system key. The signer
Fig. 6. Initialization of Multisignature scheme, SOAP technologies can be
used in data transmission.
of the system has a public key which is produced by the
TCC when the signer joins the system. The trusted_role com-
putes:
, then . Let ,
the trusted_role secretly sends ( , ) to the signer with the
public key . will be used by as the first signature key. It
is hard to compute from without the system key under
the RSA assumption.
The signer sends ( , , ) to the credential_role, and
the latter verifies the following:
(1)
The data ( , , ) are valid if the (1) is successful, which
means all signers agree to issue a ticket. Otherwise the data
( , , ) are invalid. While the equation is successful for
, the credential_role computes a system public
key:
The credential_role registers in a public directory a vector
for signers . The data
will be used and changed when a valid signature is made. The
processes are shown in Fig. 6.
B. Multisignature Scheme
When the verifier accesses the system public key , and the
public vector in the TCC, the data
must be correct, otherwise the signature is unavailable since the
verifier cannot verify the signed message.
Assuming that a message including
service information and users requirements will be signed
by the signers . , the secret key of
signer is changed when the message has been signed
( and ). This means is a
once-a-time secret key and it will improve the security of the
system. is a public prime number which is known to signers
and it will be used in the new multi-signature scheme. The
processes of the multi-signature scheme are below.
Input: ( , , , ),
Signer :
Step 1.
1.1 Picks and computes: .
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1.2 Computes: .
will be used as the secret key by in the next signing
operation.
1.3 Computes: .
1.4 Sends the pair ( , ) to the credential_role.
The credential_role can now produce a ticket but it is not able
to get the secret key from the data ( , ).
Credential_role:
Step 2. The credential_role computes
and
is published in the public directory, it will be required to
issue another ticket. ( , , ) is a ticket which will be used
for requesting services.
It should be noted when using ticket , both the user and the
service provider are signers, however, the ticket ( , , ) is
only sent by the credential_role to the user. The user will send
the ticket to a service provider to ask for a purchase. The service
provider, as a verifier, will verify the ticket. The verifier will
follow the next steps when the ticket is received.
Verifier:
Step 3. The verifier knows the public data
in the TCC and data ( , , ), checks that:
(2)
It is easy to see that if the signer and the credential_role follow
the steps, the (2) will be valid:
Step 4. The verifier sends the ticket to the TCC. The latter
will update the data and prepare a charging bill for the user.
The signed message in the multisignature scheme will be in-
valid if the data is changed. Then the credential_role can re-
voke the ability to sign messages of the signers.
V. SYSTEM SECURITY
A. Threat Analysis
First we analyze the threats to the system, including threats
from outsiders and consider how to address the security prob-
lems of duplication, forgery and modification. Recall that there
are four roles in the scheme. They are the signer, the verifier, the
credential_role and the trusted_role.
Outsider Threat: An outsider knows the public data ( , )
and . It is hard to compute the secret key
from and from without system key under the RSA
assumption.
Verifier: knows ( , ) and ticket ( , , ) in the first
sub-scheme and and ticket ( , , ) in
the second subscheme. But no useful message can be obtained
from these public data. The verifier knows no more information
about the key than the outsider.
Credential_role: can revoke the anonymity of the users since
it can control the ability to sign messages by the signers. It
knows only as much as the outsider does and hence it cannot
get the secret key either.
Signer: knows the secret key of tickets , , but cannot
use the secret key and the ticket twice. Using the secret key
a second time, to produce another ticket, requires a second
verification. If the previous verifier was honest, the public data
in the TCC would be updated and the second ticket would be
rejected. There are similar cases for the signers in the second
subscheme.
Trusted_role: knows the system key , and can get the
signer’s key . So the TARC must be trusted. Here the
trusted_role can be a judge.
The secret keys and are not revealed at the end of the
process and no secret information is revealed during the run-
ning of the system. They are only dependent on the trusted_role,
and does not depend on the credential_role. The security is also
improved since the secret keys are changed once a message is
signed.
Duplication is prevented since using a ticket twice requires
that the ticket be verified twice, and the second verification
cannot succeed as the data in TCC are changed after the first ver-
ification. In the multi-signature scheme, for instance, the TCC
issues tickets and sends them to users. The other four, even the
trusted_role, cannot forge a ticket because the messages of ( ,
) are only sent to the TCC which is not able to get the se-
cret key from the data. To protect from eavesdropping or
sending the ticket to other users, SOAP technology can be used
between users and the TCC. The user cannot modify the service
information since it is needed in the ticket verification.
There is no limitation on the service providers with our
approach. Hence this scheme can be used by wireless service
providers. The PKI technologies [23] could be used in the
processing of the scheme. For example, in the initialization of
the system for the tickets , , the trusted_role may use PKI
approach to secretly send ( , ) to a signer.
The data transferred in current wireless environments is
prone to loss. The ticket scheme can preserve the integrity of
exchanged data in the lossy wireless environments. This means
either the system can find the lost data or users cannot obtain
services. For instance, tickets , need to be sent to the TCC
and the verifier. Tickets are invalid if data is lost in these two
processes. When this occurs, users have to send tickets again
until they are received. The verifier will send tickets to the
credential_role. The system can find the lost data when they are
missing, and users can still get services since tickets are valid
through verifications. Users may use tickets twice since the
data ( , ) in the TCC are not updated in time. However,
the system will double charge the users if it receives the same
ticket twice.
B. Logical Proof for Security
We have demonstrated that the secret key of a ticket does
not appear during a business process. This section examines
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the ticket issue and use stages using logical proof [24]. Log-
ical proof allows analysis of trust between principals involved in
authentication. The ticket approach is about access control and
not about authentication, hence, the analysis is different from
analysis of authentication protocols. The goal is not to prove an
indentity of principals but to prove that a user has been granted
privilege to access a service. The use of logical proof requires
the transformation of the ticket approach into an idealised pro-
tocol and then refinement until the required trust is obtained. We
do not repeat the ticket approach and do not show the logical
proof for tickets and but for ticket , because the logical
proofs are similar. The idealized protocol associated to ticket
for logical proof is as follows:
M1: ;
M2: ;
M3: ;
M4: ;
M5: ;
M6: .
We have the following assumptions with PKI technlogy
where , and means shared keys between User
and TCC, TCC and service provider, User and service provider
respectively.
A1: User TCC: User TCC;
A2: TCC believes
Service Provider
A3: ;
A4: User believes;
Service Provider;
A5: TCC believes is fresh where ;
A6: TCC believes is fresh;
A7:Service provider believes is fresh.
To verify the approach we need to reach the following states:
P1: TCC believes User believes ( , , );
P2: TCC believes User believes ( , , );
P3: Service provider believes ( , , );
P4: TCC believes service provider believes ( , );
P1 relates to the end of the system initialization phase and the
other three relate to the ticket use process. We prove these states
as follows:
Proof: After M2 and M3:
R1: TCC sees ( , , ) and ( , , )
From R1, A1, and the message meaning rule [24];
R2: TCC believes the User once said ( , , ) and ( ,
, );
Since TCC believes , are fresh (A5, A6) and using the
nonce verification rule [24];
R3: TCC believes user believes ( , , ) and ( , ,
);
(P1) ans (P2) have been proved.
After M4;
R4: Service provider sees ( , , )
From R4 and A4 and the message meaning rule;
R5: Service provider believes User once said ( , , )
Since User believes is fresh and the nonce verification
rule;
R6: Service provider believes user believes ( , , )
From M4;
R7: Service provider believes user controls ( , , )
From the jurisdiction rule [24], R6 and ;
R8: Service provider believes ( , , )
(P3) has been proved.
After M6
TCC sees ( , ),
From A2 and the message meaning rule;
R9: TCC believes service provider said ( , )
Using the nonce verification rule, A3 and A7;
R10: TCC believes service provider believes ( , )
P4 has been proved. .
C. RBAC Management
In this subsection, we analyze the security of the system from
the management viewpoint, and then we discuss how to use
RBAC for the management of the M-service system.
With RBAC, users cannot associate with permissions di-
rectly. Permissions must be authorized for roles, and roles must
be authorized for users. In RBAC administration, two different
types of associations must be managed, i.e. associations
between users and roles, and associations between roles and
permissions. When a user’s job changes, only the user/role
associations change. If the job is represented by a single role,
then when a user’s job changes, only two user/role associations
need to be changed: remove the association between the user
and the user’s current role, and add an association between the
user and the user’s new role.
As we mentioned before, relationships of roles such as Role
hierarchies, SSD, and DSD have to be decided when a system
is designed. Some relationships like cardinality, the maximum
number of users etc, can be decided when the system is in op-
eration.
Now we consider the RBAC management of the new payment
scheme. There are four major roles in the system, the TARC,
the user, the TCC and the service provider. The TARC, the TCC
and the service provider, should be companies comprising many
participants. We will not discuss the relationships of all the par-
ticipants in these companies since they are beyond this paper.
We will only consider a manager role in the TCC and the ser-
vice provider separately. In Fig. 7, there are some dotted lines
from the TARC, TCC, and service provider to the staff since
these components are staff members. Therefore they are senior
to the role of staff. In TCC, the work of an operator can be de-
cided by the manager, so the manager inherits the operator, e.g.
. The relationship of the operator and the
manager in the service provider is similar to that in the TCC.
The TARC, TCC, and service provider have DSD rela-
tionships with the user. This is because everyone in these
three companies can be a user, but cannot act at the same
time. The staff in these three companies must first log out
if they want to register as users. For example, a person,
who is a staff member of the TARC, can not work as a staff
member and be a user in the same time. This is because a
staff member in the TARC knows the private information
of service providers. The people in the TCC and the service
provider need to verify tickets, for instance, ticket , the TCC
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Fig. 7. Relationships of the roles in the M-service system.
computes and the service provider has to check whether
or not.
These tasks cannot be done by one person.
The TARC has an SSD relationship with the TCC. This is
because the TARC knows the system key that can be used to
trace the personal message of users and the duties of the TCC
are to issue tickets for users, to verify tickets and to prepare bills.
The latter never needs to know any private information of users.
The TARC has an DSD relationship with the service provider
for a similar reason to the relationship between the TARC and
the users.
The TCC has DSD relationship with the service provider. The
service provider knows a ticket ( , , ) that will be sent
to the TCC. The latter will verify the ticket and update data ( ,
). Based on the verification, the TCC will send a bill to
users. Users may receive a wrong bill if a person is authorized
by both of the TCC and the service provider at the same time.
VI. ANALYSIS OF TICKET USAGE AND RELATED WORKS
A. Ticket Usage and An Example
First let us consider the tickets and . Since the signature
of and are similar, we will only consider ticket .
Let us suppose that users, service providers are registered by
UDDI in the TCC. A ticket will be obtained by a user who re-
quests the service in the ticket. When requiring a service, the
user goes to the TCC for a ticket. The credential_role will use
SOAP to send a message including the service information,
current time and user’s requirements to the user. As a signer,
the user signs the message and makes a ticket ( , , ).
The ticket ( , , ) is acceptable to the service provider.
As a verifier, the service provider verifies if the ticket is valid
or not, using the data ( , ) in the TCC. Neither the service
provider nor the credential_role knows who the user is. Only the
trusted_role can trace the user from the public key . When the
ticket ( , , ) is used the credential_role will make a
record for the data . The record will be used to prevent the
ticket from being duplicated and to issue a charging bill. Then
users can see the bill at any time. Finally, the credential_role can
send a bill to the user.
In the mechanism presented here, a user can issue many
tickets which can be used at any time, because a ticket’s
validity depends only on the data in the TCC. The data
are published in the public direc-
tory. Thus there is no order of tickets. The user can also lend
the ticket ( , , ) to others. This is very convenient for
users. Furthermore, most computing in this scheme is done on
the terminal side (the user or the service provider) which can
reduce the resources needed for the M-service system.
Let us now consider . Ticket binds a user and service
providers and it should be an agreement between the user and
the service providers.
When a user requires a ticket from the TCC, the cre-
dential_role will send the user’s requirement to the service
providers. The credential_role will issue a public key for the
user and the service providers if the service providers agree
to provide the service. The credential_role sends a message
including the service information, current time, requirement
and agreements of the service providers to the user and the
service providers. As signers, the user and the service providers
use their secret key to sign this message, and then return the
data ( , ) to the TCC. The credential_role makes a ticket
( , , ) and sends it to the user. The ticket ( , , )
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Fig. 8. Usage of ticket t , SOAP is used in data transmission.
can be used by the service provider. As a verifier, the service
provider uses the public data in the TCC to
verify if the ticket is valid or not. Neither the service provider
nor the credential_role knows who the user is. Only the TCC
can trace the user’s identity from the public key . After the
data is updated, the user can see a clear charging bill in the
TCC. Finally, the credential_role can send a bill to the user.
This can be seen in Fig. 8.
As the tickets , , and have no fixed order, this means
no ticket needs to be used earlier or later. This is because the
data for a ticket verification are in the public
directory. In addition, the datum is changed and marked while
the ticket ( , , ) is used. Therefore, a ticket cannot be used
twice.
Based on the two sub-schemes, the overall solution has the
following features:
1) It is anonymous for the user.
2) The ticket can be transferred to others.
3) The security of the system is improved since the secret
keys and are used only once.
We give one example to explain how the schemes work. The
example related to the single signature scheme is for ticket .
Suppose the system initialization is: , and
, , such that . Here
. For simplicity, we suppose the hash
function is .
Let us assume that a user is . Randomly selecting
then , computes
. The trusted_role sends to
the user with .
Suppose the first time the user needs to sign the message
which includes the service information, etc. The user
sends to the credential_role, the cre-
dential_role verifies whether or not.
is published by TCC.
Input: .
User: Randomly chooses and computes
, ,
and
. The user sends to the verifier_role the signature
(15, 201, 9) as a ticket.
Verifier_role: At first the verifier_role checks
and then computes if the
above equation is succeed.
The verifier_role must get the public pair
in the TCC when s/he verifies whether the ticket
is available or not. The ticket is unavailable if the public
pair (25, 163) is changed. After the verifier_role checked the
availabiblity of the ticket, he/she sends to
the TCC to update (25, 163).
B. Comparisons
Related work has been done on secure billing for E-services
[9], securing XML Web services [25] and accountable anony-
mous access to services [21].
A secure billing scheme for M-service has been proposed
in [9]. It demonstrates how a micro payment scheme can be
integrated into a prepaid charging protocol and users obtain
tickets from the universal mobile telecommunication systems
(UMTS) service providers, who act as brokers. When requiring
services from service providers, the tickets are then sent by the
users to the service providers. The settlements between the ser-
vice providers and the brokers are then accomplished offline.
The UMTS service providers will collect the billing information
from all the service providers accessed by given users and inte-
grate them in a single bill addressed to the users. This proposal
is different from ours in two aspects. First, it focuses on authen-
tication between users and service providers to billing by using
smart card technology and elliptic curve cryptography. There-
fore, there is no facility for various services and no protocols for
different kinds of tickets. By contrast, our work provides a rich
variety of options that can deal with all documents of services.
Second, users in the secure billing scheme have to send their
identities to service providers. The identities are encrypted on
the way to the service providers and are protected from eaves-
droppers. However, the service providers know the identities.
Hence, it has does not providing anonymity for the users with
respect to service providers. In our scheme, users are anony-
mous to service providers since tickets sent by the users to the
service providers include all required information for services.
Securing XML Web services is described by Damiani, Vimer-
cati, and Samarati in 2002 [25]. Two experiments are discussed.
One is that restricting access to an XML Web service to autho-
rized users. Another one is that protecting the integrity and con-
fidentiality of XML messages exchanged in a Web service en-
vironment. The authors introduce SOAP highlights, how to use
SOAP headers for credential transfer and access control. The
main difference between our scheme and the work in [25] is that
we focus on a trusted model for users and service providers in a
wireless environment and consider a solution for different kinds
of M-services, whereas the latter is a discussion of providing a
secure infrastructure to XML Web services.
Finally, anonymous access to services in mobile envi-
ronments is presented in [21]. It illustrates a ticket based
mechanism for service access and proposed how agencies
and tickets work together through a ticket based protocol
between users, customer care agencies and service providers.
The protocol accomplishes authentication of service providers
to mobile users, establishment of a shared session key be-
tween users and service providers, and correct and undeniable
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charging. However, our work substantially differs from that
proposal. Differences arise in the following three aspects.
First, their protocol does not provide an overall solution for
various services but only a special mobile service of type
. By comparison, we have analyzed the characteristics of
various services and presented a detailed scheme for different
kinds of services. Second, the protocol addresses the problems
of lack of trust and scalability in mobile systems. We have
also discussed in addition a possible charging scheme for
M-services. Finally, the tickets in their work have to follow
some specific models such as the Outlet model, the Kiosk
model or the Agency model. Therefore, the main processing in
the protocol is authentication between users, service providers
and customer care agencies. By contrast, users in our scheme
obtain the required tickets and use them when a service is
required; we have also provided authentication between users,
trusted authorities and the service providers.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
M-service systems are becoming increasingly popular in
business. They can be regarded as a special form of electronic
commerce, where users buy services instead of products from
service providers over the network. In this paper, a secure and
flexible scheme for accessing M-services is proposed. In our
secure M-service system, the TCC issues tickets for the users.
The ticket can specify a range of access control policies for
different types of services. The user presents the ticket to the
service provider who can then verify its validity. Based on the
privileges in the ticket the access to the service is provided to
the user. The scheme is scalable to large systems involving
multiple domains. It is also able to support anonymity and
user privacy if required. New users and service providers
can trust each other and join the system at anytime. We have
considered a possible approach to charging the users for the
service provided.
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